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Stackelberg Solution Concept for General 
Multistage Games 
JAROSLAV DOLEŽAL 
The so-called Stackelberg solution concept for two-player nonzero-sum games is applied to 
a general class of multistage games and a set of necessary optimality conditions is obtained using 
certain results of discrete optimal control theory and theory of mathematical programming. 
These necessary conditions have the form of a discrete non-linear two-point boundary-value prob-
lem in general setting. To solve such problem certain iterative procedures must be employed to 
compute the Stackelberg solution in practical cases. 
For a more special class of linear multistage games with both cost functionals being quadratic 
it is possible to derive an explicite computational scheme for the determination of the open-loop 
Stackelberg solution, which can be easily implemented. As an illustration, a simple example 
of this type is solved in detail and comparison with equilibrium and noninferior solution concepts 
is performed. The presented theory can found interesting applications in economical problems, 
management, etc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this contribution a general class of two-player non-zero-sum multistage games 
is investigated from the point of view of the so-called Stackelberg solution concept 
rediscovered in [1]. This concept was applied earlier to differential games in [2 — 4] 
and also some aspects concerning the application of this concept to multistage games 
using the dynamic programming approach were pointed out. The possibility to 
obtain analogous results for multistage games and discrete optimal control problems 
with two objectives was studied by the author in [5 - 7] applying the mathematical 
programming techniques. 
It is well-known that in the case of nonzero-sum games the notion of optimality 
is generally nonunique and it can be defined in several different ways assuming always 
certain mode of behaviour of each participating player. The mostly studied solution con-
cepts are equilibrium, minimax and non-inferior ones, which were applied to multistage 
games in [8]. However, the all mentioned solution concepts require that the formula-
tion of a game in question is in certain sense symmetric with respect to each player. 
As this is not always true, the player having more favourable position can improve 
his cost functional taking advantage of this fact. As atypical example of such situation, 
the two-player nonzero-sum game can be mentioned, the case in which one player 
does not know the cost functional of the other player. 
For the further studied class of two-player nonzero-sum multistage games a set 
of necessary optimality conditions is derived for the so-called open-loop Stackelberg 
solution using the mathematical programming approach, e.g., see [9—10]. These 
conditions are then applied to the case of linear multistage games with quadratic cost 
functionals and the more explicit form of the open-loop Stackelberg solution is 
computed. In this way a discrete analogy of the above mentioned results [2 — 4] is 
obtained. 
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
For the purpose of this study the following definition of the Stackelberg solution 
concept for two-player nonzero-sum games will be satisfactory, see [1—4]. 
Definition 2.1. Given a two-player nonzero-sum game, where Player 1, resp. 
Player 2, minimizes a cost functional Jt(u, v), resp. J2(u, v), selecting the appropriate 
strategies u and v from the admissible strategy sets U and V, respectively. The strategy 
pair (u, v) is called a Stackelberg solution with Player 2 as a leader and Player 1 as 
a follower if for any v eV and any ueU 
(1) J2(u, v) = J2(u°(v), v), 
where the mapping u°: V -> U is defined by the relation 
(2) Ji(u°(v), v) = min Jx(u, v) 
ueU 
and 
(3) u = u°(v). 
Further details and consequences of this definition can be found in [2 — 7]. At this 
place let us only remark that Stackelberg solution with Player 2 as the leader is optimal 
for Player 2 if he announces his move first and if the aim of Player 1 is to minimize 
Ju while that of Player 2 is to minimize J2. Such situation can for example arise if 
the information pattern of a game in question is biased in the sense that Player 1 
knows only his cost functional, while Player 2 knows both cost functionals. Player 1 
is thus forced to follow using Stackelberg strategy u if Player 2 announces his Stackel-
berg strategy v. 
This solution concept will be further applied to multistage games. General two-
player nonzero-sum multistage game is supposed to be described in the following 
way, see [5 — 8]. 
The dynamic behaviour of the system is determined by a vector difference equation 
(4) xk+. = fk(xk, uk,vk), k == 0 , 1 , . . . , K - 1 , x0 = given , 
where the positive integer K denotes the prescribed number of stages, xk e E" denotes 
state of the system at the stage k, uk e E
m and vk e E" are controls (decisions) at the 
stage k, and finally fk: E" x E
m x Ep -» E". If not otherwise stated, all vectors are 
treated as column-vectors except of the gradients of various functions, which are 
always assumed to be row-vectors. 
The cost functionals J1 and J2 are given by the relations 
K - l 
(5) Ji = g'(xK) + X K(xk, uk, vk), i = 1, 2 , 
k = 0 
where gl: E" -> E1 and hlk: E" x E
m x Ep -» E1. Here and henceforth it is assumed 
that Player 2 is the leader. 
Definition 2.2. Any sequence 
u = {u0, uu ..., u x _i | ukeE
m, k = 0 ,1 , ...,K - 1} 
is denoted as an admissible open-loop strategy of Player 1. An open-loop strategy 
of Player 2 is defined in a quite analogical way. 
Now it is possible to apply the Stackelberg solution concept to the class of just 
defined multistage games. The aim is to obtain necessary optimality conditions for 
this problem to be able to determine open-loop Stackelberg solutions in a general 
case, at least in principal. 
No further constraints concerning x, u, and v will be imposed. Such constraints, 
if present, would cause considerable troubles, because the complexity of the further 
presented relations would be increased. Then it is also not excluded the possible 
failure of the described approach. 
3. NECESSARY OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS 
It is easy to see that the application of the Stackelberg solution concept results 
in a two-level optimization. This concept can be also applied to resolve optimizations 
problems with two objective functions [7]. The multistage case was treated there 
using the general results of [9]. In this way the two-level discrete maximum principle 
was obtained, however, certain convexity requirements were necessary. 
As we shall see such convexity assumptions will not be necessary in the studied case. 
Namely, in our approach the maximum condition is not used in an explicite way. 
Then the necessary conditions for discrete optimal control problems [9, Theorem 5] 
can be applied not taking into the account the pertinent convexity assumptions. Such 
conditions can be derived quite easily [9, Proposition 3]. Similar technique was 
presented earlier in [10]. 
Turning back to the studied problem we see that if Player 2 is the leader, the 
corresponding mapping u° in (2) is determined by the solution of a discrete optimal 
control problem given by system equations (4) and cost functional Jt with v being 
now a sequence of the parameters. Assume for a moment that to each v there exists 
a unique corresponding u determined by (2). Recall that U = Em and V = Ep in the 
studied unconstrained case. The desired mapping u° can be described implicitely 
by a set of necessary optimality conditions for the just mentioned discrete optimal 
control problem. In general, let the following assumption be valid. 
Assumption 3.1. All functions appearing in (4) and (5) are twice continuously 
differentiable in corresponding domains of definition. 
From [ 9 - 1 0 ] it follows that then there exist row-vectors Xk e E", k = 0, 1, ..., K 
satisfying 




where the Hamiltonian H^+ 1 is written as 
(7) HUi(x, u, v) = - h l ( x , u,v) + Xk+l fix, u,v), k = 0,\, ...,K - 1 , 
and 
(8) ^-Hl+,(xk,uk,vk) = 0, k = 0,\,...,K-\. 
ou 
Here x0, xlt..., xK denote the state trajectory corresponding to the pair of sequences 
(H, V). The relations (4), (6) and (8) are the multistage analogy of condition (2) in the 
definition of Stackelberg solution. Hence, a Stackelberg solution (u, v) must necessari-
ly satisfy these relations, and in the same time the cost functional Jz should be mini-
mized. This is a nonstandard form of the discrete optimal control problem and, 
therefore, several preliminary steps are necessary if we want to apply the results 
of [ 9 - 1 0 ] . 
Assumption 3.2. The n x n-dimensional matrices 
~fk(x,u,v), k = 0,l,...,K-l 
ox 
are regular for any x e £", u e Em and v e Ep. 
From (6) and (8) we then obtain (arguments are omitted for the sake of simplicity) 
(9) AM 1=(xk +
 dj±\ f ^ 1 = FJXxk, Xk, uk, vk) , 
) = - - ' 
dx ' 
(m) Mk+i _
 dhl , ( x , 3hk\ [SAY
1 dfk _ T , 
where /c = 0, 1, ..., K — 1. Here fk and Gt denote n-dimensiona] and m-dimensional 
functions, respectively, and T denotes transposition. Constraints (4) and (9) can be 
written in a more compact form 
U r + J lFk(yk,uk,vk)\ 
where \xT, X]T represents now the new state variable. 
Necessary optimality conditions for the Stackelberg solution are then obtained as 
the necessary optimality conditions for the discrete optimal control prcbkm with the 
cost functional J2, constraints (10) and (11), where u and v are the controls, and with 
boundary conditions 
(12) x0 = given , XK = g\xK) . 
dx 
Under Assumptions 3.1—3.2 the results of [9], again without the convexity re-
quirements, or of [10] can be applied, but from the practical reasons let us make one 
additional assumption. The terminal condition for XK in (12) must be clearly treated 
as a state constraint. However, in this case we are not allowed to put multiplier —1 
in the definition of the corresponding Hamiltonian as it was possible in (7). On the 
other hand, the case with this multiplier equal to zero is patholcgical ar.d of little 
interest from both practical and computational point of view. Hence, let us impose 
the following "normality" assumption, which is not restrictive frcm the practical 
view-point. 
Assumption 3.3. For the discrete optimal control problem with the cost functional 
32 and constraints (10) —(12) the corresponding Hamiltonian can be written as 
Jfk+1(x, I, u, v) = -h
2
k(x, u, v) + fik + 1fk(x, u, v) + 
+ vk+1Fk(x,X, u, v), k = 0, 1, ...,K - 1 , 
where fik and vk are n-dimensional row-vector multipliers. 
Now we can rather easily apply the mentioned results of [9 - 1 0 ] to this optimal 
control problem. After some straightforward manipulations, omitted here for the 
sake of brevity, we obtain the desired necessary optimality conditions for a open-loop 
Stackelberg solution of multistage games. These conditions are summarized in the 
following theorem, where we use the notation 
Hl+1(x, U, V) = —hl(x, u, v) + nk+1fk(x, u,v), fe = 0 , 1 , . . . , K — 1 . 
Theorem 3.1. Consider a two-player nonzero-sum multistage game (4) and (5), 
where Player 2 is the leader. Further suppose that Assumptions 3.1 — 3.3 are fulfilled 
and that the strategy pair (M, V) is a Stackelberg solution of this game. The correspond-
ing trajectory let us denote as ic0, xu ..., xK. 
Then there exist row-vector multipliers Xk, nk, vk belonging to E", k = 0, 1, ..., K, 
and CfcS£m, fe «• 0 , 1 , . . . , K — 1, such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) ,.-&*, K,-f; 
OX ox 
_ 3H2+1 oFk dGk dg
2 3 V . 
(b) M* = —" + v* + i — + Ct—", / • ; - = - — + VK— j- , 
ox ox ox dx ox* 
v0 = 0 ; —@)'-6©' 
(d) ^ ' V -
du 
(A 3 / /*2 +«4-v ai?* 4- r 5 G* - 0 • 
(ej — — + vk+i —- + Qk — = ° > 
OM du ou 
(o £fti + ^,ffi + iia.o. 
where always fc = 0, 1 K — 1 and all expressions are evalutated for xk, Xk, uk 
and vk. 
Remark 3.1. Looking through the Theorem 3.1 it is not very difficult to see that the 
Assumption 3.1 can be somewhat released, e.g., function g2 can be only continuously 
differentiable, etc. 
Remark 3.2. Strictly speaking the Stackelberg strategy pair (u, i>) need not be the 375 
unique one, however, all such solutions must satisfy the stated Theorem 3.L It 
follows that the mapping u° is then multivalued. On the other hand, the values of both 
cost functionals can be different, in general, for various Stackelberg solutions and 
the question of the appropriate choice arises. Also certain a priori provisions must 
be postulated to overcome existing uncertainty in decision-making. Some further 
details in this respect can be found in [7], where two-level optimization problems 
were studied. 
Remark 3.3. It is easy to see that the conditions (a) —(f) of Theorem 3.1 represent 
a discrete nonlinear two-point boundary-value problem. To solve this problem in its 
general setting some numerical iterative methods must be applied, see [11]. 
4. LINEAR MULTISTAGE GAMES WITH QUADRATIC 
COST FUNCTIONALS 
Fairly deep results can be obtained if we assume that the system equations (4) are 
linear and the cost functionals (5) quadratic. In this special case it is possible to 
derive an analytic scheme for the computation of open-loop Stackelberg strategies. 
Relations (4) and (5) are then replaced by 
(13) xk+1 = Axk + Bxuk + B2vk, k = 0, 1, ...,K - 1 , 
K-l 
(14) Jt = \x
T




kRnuk + v{Rl2vk) , i = 1, 2 . 
k = 0 
Again we assume that the initial state x0 is given. Dimensions of x, u, and v are the 
same as in preceding sections. In this way also all dimensions of various matrices 
in (13) and (14) are determined. 
The just described multistage game is supposed to be autonomous, i.e., its para-
meters (various matrices) do not vary with k. The only reason for such assumption 
is to avoid resulting notational complexity without any substantial gain. Not loosing 
any generality we may also assume that the matrices M,-, Qt, Ri}, i, j = 1, 2 are 
symmetric. Further let us assume that the matrix A is regular, M{, Qit Ru, j = 1, 2, 
i + j positive semidefinite and Rtt, i = 1, 2 positive definite. Then also Assumptions 
3.1 — 3.2 are satisfied. The "normality" requirement in Assumption 3.3 would need 
a longer analysis of the corresponding quadratic programming problem so as to 
check this fact. However, this is not the purpose of this paper and therefore we 
simply assume that Assumption 3.3 is fulfilled, i.e., the studied problem is meaningful. 
The necessary optimality conditions of the stated Theorem have now a simple form 




Xk+i = Axk + Bгuk + B2vk, 
h = ~xІQi + Xk+1A, 
Џћ = -xÏQ2 + џk+iA + v_ + 1 i4-
т ß . + 
+ £*5 г A- r ßi , 
vk + 1 = vkA
т -ţkB
т, 
k = 0,1,...,K- 1, 
(16) 
uk = RnB1Xk+1 , 
vk = Riz-BlPk+i , 
Ck = (l*k+lBl — ^Jk+lI*iI*llI*2l)I*ll 
and with boundary conditions 
0,1, ...,K- 1 , 
(17) x0 = given , 
Xк = - x ^ M , , 
Џк = -xткM2 + VjtM, , 
v0 = 0 . 
Let us recall that Xk, nk and vk are by definition the row-vectors. Therefore trans­
position must be used when necessary. In our notation A~T = ( A _ 1 ) T = (AT)~l. 
To solve the problem (15) —(17) let us assume that 
ra-fca&l-»-*« •••••-• 
where the n x /.-matrices Pk, Nk, Wk, Sk are to be determined. Such technique is 
often used when dealing with discrete linear two-point boundary-value problems. 
Therefore let us state only the final results, which can be obtained after inserting (18) 
in (15) —(17). Then the open-loop Stackelberg solution (u, v) of linear-quadratic 
multistage game with Player 2 as a leader can be written as follows: 
(19) [ " V l R r i ^ 0 IVPk+i ^ l r M fe==0,l,...,K-l, 




т(Pk + 1FІ + Wk+1Fђ - ß . , 
Nk = A








k + Sk+1Ft) + ß . , J 
\ k = 0,í,...,K- l , 
with the final conditions 
(21) PK = -M1 , NK= -M2, WK = 0, SK = Mt. 
For convenience, the further explained notation was introduced (index k ranges 
always from 0 to K — 1): 
(22) *'=R 3-*-K t 
(23) Fl = A-'i-B^BlP^, - B2R2}B
T
2Nk + 1 + I), 
F2k = A-'i-B^BlW^ - B2R^BlSk+l) , 
Fl = A-^-B.R^R^R^BlP^ + B.R^BlN^,), 
Ft = A-'t-B.R^R^BlW^, + B.R^BlS^ + I) , 
(24) r*+1 = * - i r k ) fc-o,i,...,K-i, r0 = i. 
Matrices $fc and rk are In x 2«-dimensional and matrices Fk, F
l
k, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
are n x n-dimensional. In fact, matrices F'k were introduced to simplify the notation. 
Finally, by symbol / we denote n x n-dimensional unit matrix. 
Now we see that the backward computation of (20) takes place first starting from 
(21). All required quantities are continuously evaluated using (22) and (23) provided 
that the inversion indicated in (22) exists. Matrices Pk,Nk, Wk, Sk and ^k
1 are 
stored during the backward run. Then in the forward run we determine Fk according 
to (24), which, in turn, enables us a parallel evaluation of Stackelberg strategies 
uk and vk realizing relation (19). However, these strategies can be also determined 
indirectly [12] by solving the original discrete linear two-point boundary-value 
problem (15)-(17). 
5. EXAMPLE 
As an illustration let us solve a simple linear-quadratic multistage game from the 
point of view of Stackelberg solution concept. For comparison also equilibrium and 
noninferior solution concepts are applied to the same problem. All variables will be 
scalars and let Player 2 be the leader in this game. 
(25) xk + 1 = xk + uk + vk, k - 0 , 1 , . . . , K - 1 , x0 = given , 
K - l K - l 




In this really academic example it is advisable to prefer the general conditions 
of the stated Theorem 3.1 to the scheme given in the previous section. We omit the 
obvious manipulations and state briefly only the results. However, let us remark 
that in this case the Assumption 3.3 is a priori satisfied. Really, if we assume that the 
problem in question is not normal we obtain that the multipliers fik, vk, (k are always 





K2 + ЪK + 1 
1 
x0 
k = 0,í,...,K- 1 . 
K2 + 3K + 1 
The corresponding values of the cost functionals (outcomes): 
( 2 8 ) Jl = 2(K2 + 3K + iyx2°' h = 2K2 + 3K+i4-
Further it is not very hard to show that in this case relations (28) determine the unique 
Stackelberg solution with Player 2 as a leader. It is enough to realize that J2 is 
a quadratic function of the control sequence v0, vt,..., vK-l of Player 2 over the 
so-called "rational reaction set" of Player 1, as defined in [3], with the corresponding 
matrix being positive definite. Therefore, relation (28), derived using necessary opti-
mality conditions, is the unique Stackelberg solution with Player 2 as a leader of the 
multistage game given by (25) and (26). 
Now let us compute for the studied game also equilibrium and noninferior solutions 
applying the theory developed in [8]. For the equilibrium solution (u*, t>*) we then 
have: 
(29) ut = v*k = —• x0 , k = 0 , 1 , . . . , K - 1 , 
V ' 2K + \ 
(30) J* = J* = ±- 2 
2 (2K + l)2 
It is a simple exercise to show that 
(31) A > J? , J2< J*2 
for general number of stages K. This result is in agreement with the general con-
clusions of [2 — 4] which say that, in general, the leader's cost functional will not 
increase if the Stackelberg solution is enforced instead of the equilibrium one. On 
the other hand, the follower's cost functional can increase or decrease depending 
on the particular problem when such comparison is made. In the studied example we 
see that the Stackelberg solution is not attractive for the follower. 
The noninferior solution (vector-valued functional) for the game (25) and (26) 
consists in fact of the whole family of such solutions. Necessary optimality conditions 
for this solution type can be found again in [8]. The one-parameter family of non-
inferior solutions has the following form: 




a(l - a) + K 
0 _ a _ 1, fc = 0,1 , . . . , i . - 1 . 
a(l - a) + K 
The corresponding values of the cost functionals: 
(33) 
J f a л _ - ( - - « ) ' ( » ' +--)-» 
; i ( a ) - 2 [ a ( l - a ) + ^
X ° ' 
Д ; 2 [«(1 - a) + Kf 
0 < a < 1 . 
All mentioned solution types are schematically depicted in Fig. 1. The shaded 
region SP represents the set of the all possible outcomes. Stackelberg solution (27) 
is denoted as the point H2 and, by the symmetry of the problem in question, Hx 
Fig. 1. Comparison of various outcomes for the illustrative example. 
corresponds to the case when Player 1 is a leader. Point E represents the equilibrium 
outcome (30) and curve M±M2 depicts the set of noninferior outcomes. This curve 
is parametrized by parameter a ranging from 0 to 1; points M1 and M2 correspond 
to a = 1 and a = 0, respectively. For example, choosing a = 0-5 we obtain the 
point til on the curve M^M2 which can be also denoted as a "fair" negotiated solution 
of the studied game, which is thus attractive to both players. 
380 6. CONCLUSIONS 
The so-called Stackelberg solution concept for two-player nonzero-sum games was 
successfully applied to a general class of multistage games. Using the results of 
discrete optimal control theory and mathematical programming it was possible to 
derive a set of necessary optimality conditions for the open-loop Stackelberg solution. 
For a special case of linear multistage games with quadratic cost functionals the 
analytical form of Stackelberg solution was derived. The suggested scheme can be 
easily implemented to the numerical solution of such problems arising for example 
in economy, management, etc. Let us finally note that the so-called "feedback" 
Stackelberg solution for this class of multistage games was studied recently in [13]. 
(Received May 6, 1978.) 
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